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Aristotle defines a citizen in functional terms: one who has a right to participate in
the deliberative and judicial functions of the state and, by exercising these rights, rules
and is ruled in turn. Aristotle says also that eligibility for citizenship in a democracy is
predicated in some way on birth. In the early days of Athenian democracy, males were
citizens if their fathers were citizens; later, they also had to be born of mothers whose
fathers were citizens. Aristotle also recognizes naturalization as a way to citizenship. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s more liberal version of this ancient conception is to make one’s
own birth on American soil a sufficient condition for citizenship. The Constitution says
nothing about good citizenship, however. Congress started to answer this question when
it established requirements for naturalization. These requirements include, as one would
expect, a willingness to swear allegiance to the U.S. above all other nations and to take an
oath to “support and defend the Constitution . . . against all enemies, foreign and
domestic.”
Though a willingness to support and defend the Constitution seems an obvious
element of good citizenship under the Constitution, the oath has its problems. Is the
Constitution clear enough for anyone to say with confidence what the oath to support and
defend means in practice? Nullifiers and even secessionists thought they were supporting
and defending the Constitution. Was their reading of the document wrong beyond
reasonable question? Does a good constitutional citizen act the part when paying taxes
that fund foreign and domestic policies that dismantle the socio-economic preconditions
of constitutional government, like a fair distribution of the nation’s wealth and equal

economic opportunity? Do citizens support and defend the Constitution when taking the
official Pledge of Allegiance, the pledge that situates the nation “under God” instead of
the Constitution? How many Americans could knowingly swear fidelity to a constitution
that subordinated religion to secular authority, as the Constitution appears to do? Given
the implicit atheism of this ordering, would such an “oath” be meaningful? Does this
ordering make sense as a matter of policy at a time when the nation’s high-tech
vulnerabilities confront suicidal warriors of God? Does this ordering make sense
philosophically if, absent religious conviction, the maxims of “human dignity” that
ground our politics are arbitrary? (Dworkin prefers “axiomatic” to “arbitrary.) Can’t
virtuous and talented persons want to live in this country and contribute to its well-being
yet still have compelling reasons to believe that the Constitution has constituted an
unfolding disaster? Should we tell applicants for citizenship that to avoid perjury (or
returning home) they should postpone reading Levinson until after they take the oath? Is
it fair to require an oath at the moment of citizenship that no fully informed person could
honestly recite again? Is it coherent to require an oath to a constitutional document that
can be amended or even peacefully overthrown under precedents that mark our proudest
national moments – including the ratification of the Constitution itself by unauthorized
and therewith, arguably, unlawful procedures? Who but a few school kids and law
schools celebrate Constitution Day? Who doesn’t celebrate Independence Day?
So the oath has its problems. But lets (try to) put these problems aside and accept
the oath as a first approximation of what a good constitutional citizen is: one who is
willing to support and defend the constitution. The question now is what is it that a good
constitutional citizen is willing to support and defend.

Because no one would say that a good citizen can’t join a campaign to amend the
constitutional document, we can’t equate the constitution to be supported and defended
with the constitutional document as it might appear at any given historical moment. Yet
since the constitution to be amended is the one that exists in some temporal present, we
can’t equate the constitution to be supported and defended with the constitution in front
of us, the apparent constitution, the one that appears in historical time. This poses a
problem: Does the Constitution’s amendability make the oath meaningless? Maybe we
can avoid this problem by hypothesizing that the oath is at bottom a promise to abide by
Article V. But two considerations defeat this hypothesis. No one, to begin with, would
commit in advance to anything and everything that the nation might process through
Article V. In addition, Article V is not a free floating norm. Article V is explicitly a part
(an “article”) of the Constitution; it is the part that provides for making other parts,
“amendments” that will be “part of this constitution.” So Article V presupposes a whole
of some sort, and whatever normative force or attractiveness the article might have would
depend partly on the normative force or attractiveness of the whole.1 We therefore need a
theory of the whole before describing good constitutional citizenship.
The Preamble seems a reasonable place to begin our reflections on the nature of
the whole. The Preamble reveals that the Constitution is formally an instrumental norm,
an ends-oriented establishment that declares ends and prescribes institutions for pursuing
them. From what we know of political rhetoric generally and the moral psychology of
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I leave aside the soundness of this presupposition and therewith the possibility that there is no “whole”
beyond some “bundle of compromises” whose “parts” (hard to avoid this term) are to be interpreted in
clause-bound ways depending on what interpreters think they can get away with politically. I leave this
possibility aside for two reasons. First, even if I assume its truth, no one is willing to live by this truth -witness the strength of the rule-of-law myths that displace this truth. And second, I accept the Socratic rule
that in dialogic inquiry about how to live, a proposition that no one can live with is false. The prescriptive
expression of this epistemic rule is: mean what you say.

political life (from Homer’s time to the present, including the time of the American
founding) people who take political things seriously conceive ends like the Constitution’s
ends as real things in some sense. Real ends are desirable, not just desired. Ends that are
desired but not desirable are apparent ends, not real ends. Yet real ends emerge as
prospectively existing things only through the clash of apparent ends. For this very reason
one can wonder whether real ends exist.2 If they do exist, then our conceptions of them
can be wrong and their attractiveness to us exerts a normative pull to which we respond
by claiming to be right and thus by trying to be right. So when we say “the war is wrong”
we’re not saying “I don’t like the war”; we’re saying “you shouldn’t like the war either.”
This last proposition would typically occur in a context where disagreement is likely. The
context would also have to be one where disagreement is appropriate. If Almighty God
told us the war was right, that would be the end of it. In appropriate contexts of
disagreement my proposition about what you shouldn’t like becomes a claim, a
proposition that calls for support in the form of reasons, like reasons why everyone
should condemn the war. By making this claim as a claim I not only have to offer
reasons, I implicitly submit my reasons to a process that can falsify them. By claiming
instead of merely asserting I acknowledge my fallibility and numerous corollary
obligations associated with truth-seeking, like trying to see things as they appear to the
other side, appealing to shared experiences, putting my mouth only where I’m willing to
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I distinguish wonder from doubt, allowing that ‘wonder’ can be silent wonder and reserving ‘doubt’ for
articulate doubt. Doubting (out loud) that, say, real justice exists is an act that, like all acts (unequivocally
so-called), can be explained only by connecting it to what both the actor and the observer can understand as
some apparent good. But because an apparent good is something that appears good, talk of an apparent
good presupposes a real good. The presumed real good involved in doubting that justice exists could,
depending on the context, be truth – i.e., about justice.

put my money, using words in their ordinary signification, obeying the rules of logic and
sound argumentation, suspending final judgment, and so forth.
As it turns out, therefore, the Preamble implicitly assumes that the good
constitutional citizen will value a process of giving and exchanging reasons with others
about what to believe about ends like justice and how to pursue them in changing
circumstances. The 1st Federalist assumes substantively the same when it imputes to its
readers a desire to show the world that “societies of men” can rise above “accident and
force” and “establish[] good government from reflection and choice.”
From what I’ve said so far, the good constitutional citizen looks a tad more like
Sandy Levinson than Tom DeLay, and that presents two problems: Is my version of the
good citizen ideologically biased? And can a good constitutional citizen share Levinson’s
negative attitude toward hard-wired constitutional institutions, which are, after all, parts
of the Constitution? Because the second problem is the easiest, I’ll start with it.
The hard-wired provisions are indeed parts of the Constitution, but preserving
them can’t be an object of the oath, for the hard-wired provisions are amendable and
therewith eliminable. Does the same apply to Article V? Strictly speaking, all parts of
Article V are amendable. Levinson shows how to get around the guarantee of equal state
representation in the Senate, and the rest of Article V can be amended through the
processes of Article V itself. But let’s assume what is in fact practically the case: that
Article V is virtually unamendable. Let’s assume further that Ackermanian amendments
aren’t real amendments and that an unamendable Article V could prove fatal to hopes for
progress toward any reasonable version of the ends of government. Would a good
constitutional citizen stand by Article V under those circumstances? I say no, for several

related reasons. The Constitution itself owes its existence to the nation’s abandoning the
amendment process prescribed by Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation. This
decision of the founding generation is available to all generations of Americans as a
morally defensible precedent because it flows from background principles regarding
legitimacy, law, and practical reason.
Madison states these principles clearly and forcefully in Federalist 40. Regarding
legitimacy, he says, quoting the Declaration of Independence: “. . . in all great changes of
established government, forms ought to give way to substance . . . [for] . . . a rigid
adherence in such cases to the former would render nominal and nugatory, the
transcendent and precious right of the people to ‘abolish or alter their governments as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.’” To this he adds that
“since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally, to move towards
their object . . . it is therefore essential, that such changes be instituted by some informal
an unauthorized propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number
of citizens.” (his emphasis) Regarding law and practical reason, he cites “two rules of
construction dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms . . . [first] that
every part of . . . [a legal] expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and
be made to conspire to some common end . . . [and, second, that] that where the several
parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more
important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the
means.” Because our good constitutional citizens could easily find themselves among the
respectable and patriotic citizens that Madison pictures, they have no firm commitment to
Article V or to any other formal process.

“Formal,” that is, in the legal sense of “formal.” They would be committed to
some other formal processes, especially the processes of logic and sound argument. Good
constitutional citizens would be committed to these processes because (1) good
constitutional citizens are attracted to the truth about the real ends of the Preamble; (2)
they assume that a true opinion of any of these ends corresponds to the nature of the end;
(3) they think the truth about any of these ends is pursued through debating different
conceptions of them -- they assume, that is, that different beliefs about x can converge
toward the truth about x; and (4) they have found through long experience that the least
questionable propositions are those achieved through what they believe to be the
principles of logic and sound argumentation.
This brings me to the second objection raised above: that my version of the good
constitutional citizen seems biased against Tom DeLay. I plead guilty only to part of this
charge. I don’t think my version of the good constitutional citizen is merely my version. I
propose that it would be the version of anyone who can think aright about this question,
and I’ll demonstrate my good faith the instant someone shows flaws in my argument or
appears with a stronger argument. I feel, accordingly, that my argument against Tom
Delay is against any claim to good constitutional citizenship that might be made on his
behalf (I don’t know that he has or would make such a claim on his own behalf). I deny
that my argument is biased against him, however, for I did not fabricate it in order to
deny his good citizenship.
My reasons for rejecting DeLay’s would-be claim to good citizenship would
begin with the observation that the Constitution is not made for people with
fundamentally different views. Many serious religionists of different faiths, not just

Islam, would find it impossible to accept the implicit secularism of the constitutional
tradition’s basic rule of evidence and the leading implication of that rule: that seeing is
believing, and that eye witness testimony is better than hearsay. Since we know of the
Creation only through hearsay, the Creation Story competes with what we know through
experience that seems universally replicable. And though we post-empiricists (or antifoundationalists) have reason to doubt that any experience is universally replicable, we
doubt this on the basis of experience that seems universally replicable. (The theory-laden
character of experience is itself confirmed by . . . (theory-laden?) experience!) We
therefore seem stuck with reason and the rules of evidence even as we have our
reasonable (evidence-backed) doubts about reason and even as we have (evidencebacked) reason to believe that evidence is never too much more than mere evidence.
Some of the believers whom I know see the rationalism that I’ve sketched as
peculiar to liberalism and the paradoxes of liberal doubt about reason as evidence of
liberal blindness and hypocrisy: blindness for liberalism’s failure to recognize its own
reliance on faith (unproved propositions accepted as axioms) and the hypocrisy in what
amounts to a religion of secularism (subordination of admitted religions to scientific ways
of thought that serve the social and psychological functions of religion). Because I think
the only way to make sense of liberalism is to see it as an expression of the rationalism I
have described, I agree that I’ve described liberal rationalism. But that I’ve described a
rationalism that is peculiar to liberalism has to be proved. It can’t just be asserted without
begging the question against those liberals who claim, as Publius does, that humankind as
such aspires to rise above accident and force and live by reflection and choice. That some
(perhaps even all) cultures manifest no such desire is not enough to prove that the desire

is no part of their makeup or that it would control other parts in any fair contest with
them. Claiming to reject liberal rationalism doesn’t prove that one actually does. Only
persons who have achieved consistency among all of their beliefs could even begin to
claim to be infallible judges of what they really believe about anything at any given
moment.3
Though many cases of liberal bigotry over the years support the charges of liberal
blindness and hypocrisy, cases can prove only that liberal rationalists can abandon their
principles, not that the principles themselves entail rationally indefensible actions or
beliefs. True, human thought has to begin with undefended assumptions. But this fact
does not entail axiomatic status for any one or even all assumptions; it simply means that
one can’t question all assumptions at the same time. So rationalism need not rest on blind
faith. Nor are rationalists compelled to put blind faith in reason. Skepticism about reason
has been a feature of the Western intellectual tradition since ancient times. Reliance on
reason is more of a necessity than a choice because it’s hard to say that one can choose to
live without reason.4 Yet a life of reflection and choice is certainly compatible with
doubting the wisdom of such a life for everyone and accommodating those who actively
try to live differently (as long as the differences are reasonable differences). Evincing this
fact is the (limited) extent to which liberal regimes tolerate anti-liberal groups whose
teachings fall short of incitement to (what rationalists count as) violence. Though I’m far
from sure about this, I don’t think you can say the same for religious regimes:
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These persons would have to claim not only consistency but also truth for their beliefs, since each of their
first-order beliefs would be accompanied by the second-order belief that it is true.
4
You can live without reason (e.g., if you’re insane) but you can’t choose to do so because choice to be
recognizable as such has to be for the sake of some recognizable good and something chosen for the sake of
some good is chosen for a reason. Choosing to live without reason would be having a reason to live without
reason. But if you had a reason to live without reason you’d not be living without reason; there would be
method in your madness, so-to-speak.

questioning God’s existence and/or providence seems irreligious to me. If so, secular or
experiential rationalism doesn’t constitute a religion; it must institutionalize self-doubt in
ways that religion can’t.
In any case, good constitutional citizens are committed to no more or less than a
regime of public reasonableness -- giving and exchanging reasons with others, from an
appreciation of their own fallibility and on the basis of replicable experiences, about the
true meaning of the Preamble’s ends and how to pursue them. These good citizens are
committed to a politics where people generally respect each other’s good faith pursuit of
public purposes through conflicting conceptions of ends and means. I call this a healthy
politics. Tom DeLay has worked for a different kind of politics.

